News from Algeria 2007

[Al-khiyal]

dimanche 21 janvier 2007 - - Les chiffres récemment communiqués par les services de sécurité sur la situation sécuritaire à Alger confirment la nette hausse de tous les indices de criminalité durant l’année écoulée. Le bilan de la Sûreté nationale comme celui de la Gendarmerie nationale abondent dans le même sens.

La criminalité comme les troubles à l’ordre public ont enregistré une tendance à la hausse, où Alger est en tête du peloton. Dans la capitale, le bilan de la Gendarmerie nationale pour l’année précédente a confirmé la tendance. Le déficit en matière de couverture sécuritaire dans le territoire de compétence de ce corps de sécurité était à la faveur des délinquants.

En effet, si la norme internationale en la matière recommande 1 gendarme pour 300 citoyens, à Alger la moyenne est d’un gendarme pour 1 075 citoyens. Pour le bilan de l’année précédente, et dans le cadre de la lutte contre la criminalité, la Gendarmerie nationale a relevé la prévalence des crimes et délits contre les personnes en enregistrant 41,61 % de l’ensemble des crimes et délits, dont les agressions et les coups et blessures volontaires avec armes blanches constituent 20,50 % de l’ensemble de ces infractions.

Ces derniers ont connu une hausse par rapport à l’année qui a précédé, en passant de 3 354 crimes et délits en 2005 à 3 948 en 2006. Les crimes comme les délits ont augmenté pour passer, respectivement, de 220 à 263 et de 3134 à 3 685.

Les crimes et délits contre les biens constituent aussi une grande partie des infractions commises dans le cadre du droit commun avec 1 945 crimes, soit 45,47 %. Le plus grand nombre de crimes enregistré dans ce volet concerne les vols, avec 527 cas soit 49,28 %.

Le nombre des personnes arrêtées par la police judiciaire a connu aussi une hausse. De 3 781, dont 1 277 ont été placées sous mandat de dépôt en 2005, leur nombre est passé à 4 534 avec 1 317 placées sous mandat de dépôt en 2006.

Selon le sexe, le nombre est presque identique, puisque celui des femmes est de 163 et celui des hommes de 165. Concernant l’âge des personnes arrêtées, la tranche comprise entre 18 et 28 ans représente 52 % de l’ensembles des personnes arrêtées.

Les personnes n’exerçant aucune fonction représentent plus de 57 % de l’ensemble des arrêtées. Si la catégorie des étudiants et des fonctionnaires dont le nombre des arrêtés a baissé en 2006, celui des travailleurs a augmenté de 17 et celui des fonctions libérales est passé de 714 en 2005 à 920 en 2006.

Durant l’année écoulée, pas moins de 91 associations de malfaiteurs ont été démantelées. Les plus importantes sont les réseaux de vol de câbles électriques et téléphoniques où 58 affaires ont été traitées. Cette action s’est soldée par l’arrestation de 36 personnes, dont 24 ont été placées en détention provisoire et 500 quintaux de cuivre récupérés.

Le démantèlement d’un réseau de trafic de stupéfiants a permis de saisir plus de 65 kg de cannabis traité. Dans le cadre de cette affaire, 3 personnes ont été écrouées. Parmi les autres grandes affaires, on note celles relatives au trafic de documents administratifs où 3 autres personnes ont été arrêtées le 19 avril 2006.

L’affaire de corruption d’Algérie Télécom était également l’une des grandes affaires traitées l’année dernière, ainsi que le démantèlement d’un groupe de malfaiteurs à Bouchaoui. D’autres affaires ont été traitées, à l’instar de celle relative à la destruction de 27 quartiers illicites, soit 664 habitations.

Concernant les troubles à l’ordre public, la Sûreté nationale a enregistré 969 cas à Alger, qui vient ainsi en première position. Aussi, et concernant la démolition des habitations illicites, la Sûreté nationale a fait part de 4 631 opérations.

Selon les bilans des services de sécurité pour 2006 : Les indices de la criminalité en hausse à Alger

[Al-khiyal]

Leaders from Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Tunisia will meet in Tripoli to discuss the situation in the Middle East, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said Friday (January 19th). The summit was initiated by Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi. The date has yet to be announced.

Algerian, Tunisian leaders to meet in Tripoli

[Al-khiyal]

Lundi 22 Janvier 2007 - - La rue Didouche-Mourad, jouxtant l’école Mouloud-Feraoun et l’hôtel touristique Mermoura, a été le théâtre d’un tragique accident survenu vendredi dernier vers 15 heures. Depuis quelques semaines, une entreprise privée de travaux publics, qui avait procédé à la démolition d’une vieille bâtisse, avait entamé la réalisation d’une clinique privée.

Selon les témoignages recueillis, le drame aurait eu lieu avant la prière d’El Asser au moment où des ouvriers étaient à pied d’œuvre en présence du chirurgien, futur propriétaire de cette infrastructure. Le mur en parpaings, haut de plusieurs mètres et soutenant des tonnes de terre fraîche provenant des fondations, s’est subitement effondré et a enseveli des personnes présentes sur les lieux. L’alerte a immédiatement été donnée par les survivants et les riverains. Les éléments de la Protection civile, accompagnés des agents de la Sûreté de wilaya, accoururent sur les lieux de la catastrophe et déployèrent d’énormes efforts pour dégager des décombres les corps des victimes. Trois morts ont été déposés à la morgue de l’hôpital Docteur- Okbi. Il s’agit de Menidjel Amar, 46 ans, père de 2 enfants, chirurgien honorablement connu, de Mouedda Bilal, 23 ans, et Bekakria Messaoud, 30 ans, ouvriers originaires de Bakhouche Lakhdar et Bouhachana. D’autre part, deux blessés, Boucherah Adel, 26 ans, et Ayad Amar 36 ans, ont été évacués vers les urgences. Ce drame a causé émoi et consternation au sein de la population. Une enquête a été ouverte pour déterminer les causes de ce tragique accident.

Effondrement d'un mur à la rue Didouche-Mourad : 3 morts et 2 blessés

[Al-khiyal]

Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) issues video of bombing targeting Halliburton-subsidiary employees in Bouchaoui, Algeria

An Al Qaeda-linked Algerian militant group posted a video on the Internet yesterday showing what they said was a deadly bomb attack on a bus carrying oil workers in the North African state in December.

The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) video appeared to show the bus taking an exit on a highway before being hit by a roadside blast. The film seemed to have been shot from a vehicle on the opposite side of the highway.

GSPC had claimed responsibility for the December 10 attack, which killed an Algerian and a Lebanese and injured eight people, including four Britons and an American.

In a textual header on the website, the group said the attack was aimed at US energy firm Halliburton, which owned a stake in the firm that employed the oil workers - Brown Root and Condor.

Condor Engineering, an affiliate of Algerian state energy group Sonatrach, owns a stake in the joint venture.

The tape showed that the militant group used satellite pictures and other advanced technology in planning and carrying out the attack.

It also showed militants building a homemade bomb using a gas cylinder, metal nuggets, a chemical and wireless detonators.

Earlier in January in a web video, GSPC leader Abu Musab Abdul-Wadud called for attacks against the French and their government allies in Algeria.

An Algerian insurgency began in 1992 after the authorities cancelled elections an Islamist party was expected to win.

Now led mainly by the GSPC, the insurgency has only about 500 fighters compared to 30,000 in the 1990s, operates usually in remote mountains and parts of the vast southern desert, and is involved in drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion.

Group posts Algeria attack video

[Al-khiyal]

In the post-September 11, 2001, world it is thoroughly understandable that the United States should reorganize its military, diplomatic, and military resources to engage, understand, and, if required, contest militant Islam. Since those tragic events in 2001, Washington has initiated wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; it has seized "enemy combatants," and has detained and interrogated them at Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba and other clandestine locations around the world; and it has radically reformed domestic terrorism laws in an effort to detect, deter, and destroy enemies of the country. But is the strategy comprehensive, or is it overly skewed toward military initiatives without taking into account measures that are needed to win the "soft war" of educating the minds and nurturing the bodies of putative enemies of the US?

My contention is that military investments are necessary and can be prudent. However, American investments in education and healthcare overseas, which are equally important in this "soft war," seem to be unsatisfactorily under-funded by the Bush administration.

Since September 11 and the apparent permanent reversal of American military fortunes in the war in Iraq, it has become abundantly clear to petroleum analysts around the world that the Middle East, which serves the world as a critical source for oil and natural gas, is either unstable, at risk, or inaccessible for investment and exploitation. Saudi Arabia, the world's largest depository of petroleum reserves, survives for the moment, yet it suffers from internal dissension and the possibility of the eventual demise of the Al-Saud regime.

Iraq, thanks to its significant sources of petroleum in the Basra area, may sell the product to world consumers, but that source is irregular and because of its location may eventually fall under the tutelage of Iranian political or economic forces. Meanwhile, America's consistent failure to engage in diplomacy with Iran since 1979 means that China has primary access to petroleum there. Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi all are protected by an American military umbrella meaning that - at least for the moment - these sources of petroleum are comparatively secure.

The general lack of security in the Middle East means that the US and other consumers of petroleum must necessarily look toward Africa for alternate sources of petroleum. Indonesia and Russia may also serve as providers to Western markets but, given the proximity of the west coast of Africa to Western European and American markets, Africa's petroleum necessarily must be considered an alternative to Middle Eastern oil. It also happens to be in Africa that petroleum and Islam mix.

Because of the instability in the Middle East, the US has come up with a military strategy to deal with the question of Islamic terrorism and the protection of petroleum assets in Africa. To cite just one example of this reorientation in strategy, in May 2003 the NATO supreme commander, General James Jones, said that the US Navy's Sixth Fleet that is based in Naples, Italy, would eventually "[s]pend half the time going down the west coast of Africa." So Africa has become a critical area of geopolitical concern for reasons of religious activism and petroleum.

The US has two plans for military joint training operations on the African continent. The first is the Global Peace Operations Initiative begun during fiscal year 2006. That initiative provided $100.4 million in FY 2006 and requested $102.6 million for FY 2007 to train and equip battalions and specialty units in Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Mali, Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, Gabon and Nigeria. The amount involved here is very modest. On average the amount dedicated per country averages close to $800,000 per recipient.

Of more direct interest to the subject here is the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which is an outgrowth of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). The PSI was started right after September 11 and spent approximately $16 million during 2002-2003 to deploy teams of Special Operations soldiers to Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to provide counter-terrorism training and equipment. The big media coup in this initiative occurred when militants of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Chad were tracked down during 2004.

The TSCTI received $3 million in funding during FY 2005 and was scheduled to receive $100 million yearly from FY 2007 through FY 2011, resulting in a total of $500 million. Troops to be trained under this program would include Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia.

It is clear that this new program in its expanded form takes cognizance of the double nexus between maintaining state stability and security and maintaining access to petroleum and natural gas sources. The inclusion of Algeria, Nigeria and Tunisia and the design of the new military training program prove that US Department of Defense planners understand the need to be engaged both militarily and socially in these key countries. The new program is multi-departmental, involving the State Department in airport security, the Treasury Department in money laundering and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in educational and health programs. What is clear from a review of the new program is that the military engagement, or "the hard power," is clearly there. What is equally clear is that the "soft power," or the need to address the question of education and healthcare, is not well funded.....

[Al-khiyal]

In this new security arrangement, Algeria is the biggest "winner." Besides the military training received, the country has been able to purchase $276 million in armaments from the US government during 2005 alone. In addition, Algeria has purchased $6.1 million in armaments from private markets. The second largest beneficiary from these changes in American policy has been Morocco. In 2005 it was able to purchase $18 million in armaments from the US government and $3.9 million in private markets.

US government arms purchases by the other beneficiary countries in these programs have been paltry. The emergence of Algeria as a key player in these new security arrangements may speak volumes about future American-Algerian cooperation. If we were to simply "follow the money," we would have to assume that Algeria and the United States may have a newly meaningful and enhanced military, intelligence, and diplomatic relationship.

Regarding the "soft" aspect of this analysis, this is the area where much greater attention and funding are warranted. Ultimately, it will be new educational systems and enhanced healthcare delivery systems that will convert the enemies of America into friends. It would seem that a modest investment in educational and healthcare initiatives would reap substantial benefits. Upon a review of USAID programs for the countries discussed here, however, it seems that "soft investment" is missing.

For example, in Mali USAID program expenditure for FY 2007 is budgeted to amount to just under $32 million, to be spread over healthcare, basic education, governance, economic growth and communications projects. During the same period and on the same programs, USAID has budgeted less than $19 million for Nigeria. There is nothing for Chad, Mauritania or Niger.

In other words, with the exception of Mali, sufficient funds have not been made available for basic education and healthcare in at least four critical countries. This is due to either poor planning or poor execution of policy - especially given what we already know about the ameliorative effect that these kinds of initiatives have on positive public perceptions of the US. Why the military aspect of this anti-terrorist initiative in the Sahel has been funded while the non-military programs have been neglected is difficult to comprehend.

Beyond the lack of balance in the appropriations for "hard" and "soft" initiatives, the other aspect that seems to be at least somewhat misguided is that most of the military training has taken place in the Sahara Desert. The expenditure of $500 million over a five-year period may be entirely appropriate if the center of gravity for the Islamist movement were located in the desert. Quite evidently, that is not the case. Militant Islamism is an urban phenomenon. In urban areas, educational systems are often under-funded and directed by Islamists (often with Saudi Arabian, Moroccan or Libyan support).

Improving standards of hygiene and medical care would improve relations between the US and the residents of beneficiary countries. In Niger, for example, Cuba has sent hundreds of doctors who have helped improve healthcare there by reforming hygienic methods and providing rudimentary medicines. How can Cuba afford to send hundreds of doctors to Niger while the United States cannot? Can Washington afford not to?

Beyond the provision of educational and medical support in urban areas, the last missing element in this effort to detect and monitor militant Islamism involves the need to collect basic intelligence or information regarding the socio-economic causes for militant Islamism. At least from the public information that is available, it seems that the United States has a limited presence on the ground in urban environments where Islamists live and recruit. It would seem that an almost immediate investment in human intelligence gathering capabilities is needed in places like Kano and Lagos in Nigeria, Abidjan in Ivory Coast, Monrovia in Liberia, Freetown in Sierra Leone, and Dakar in Senegal.

Finally, one has to underscore that the traditional forms of Islam that have been practiced in Africa over centuries (especially variants of Sufi Islam) have never posed a security risk to the interests of the United States. It is only one smaller, more violent variant of militant Islam that needs regular surveillance and counter-measures. This violent form of Islam finds political expression because real and legitimate frustrations exist in many Muslim communities regarding failed educational systems, sub-standard healthcare delivery systems, high rates of infant mortality, and endemic poverty.

It seems that while the US must continue with its investment in military programs, to avoid the "soft power" alternatives that are both available and inexpensive would seem to work only to the detriment of American security.

America in Africa: addressing a mix of Islam and oil

[Al-khiyal]

One soldier killed, six others wounded in bomb attack on army convoy at Meshta Al Frouda