The Pentagon plans for an African Command

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In what may be the most glaring admission that the U.S. military needs to dramatically readjust how it will fight what it calls 'the long war,' the Pentagon is expected to announce soon that it will create an entirely new military command to focus on the globe's most neglected region: Africa.

Pentagon sources say that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is close to approving plans for an African Command, which would establish a military organization to singlehandedly deal with the entire continent of Africa. It would be a sign of a significant strategic shift in Administration policy, reflecting the need to put more emphasis on proactive, preventative measures rather than maintaining a defensive posture designed for the Cold War.

The Pentagon has five geographic Unified Combatant Commands around the world and responsibility for Africa is awkwardly divided among three of those: European Command, Pacific Command and Central Command — which is also responsible for running the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Creating an African Command would be an important structural move to coordinate U.S. defense policy for the continent, as well as provide a single military organization for agencies like the State Department and the CIA to work with in the region.

A defense source says the new command, which is part of Rumsfeld's ongoing worldwide reassessment of the military's division of labor, may be headed by Gen. William "Kip" Ward, a respected officer who is the Army's only four-star African-American general. Ward has boots-on-the-ground experience in Africa: he was a commander during the U.S.'s ill-fated mission in Somalia in 1993 and also served as a military representative in Egypt in 1998. Ward is currently the deputy commander at European Command, and as such oversees U.S. military relations with 43 African countries.

But a former military officer who thinks highly of Ward nonetheless says creating an entirely new command compounds an existing problem. "The size and number of headquarters already is skewed too far in favor of 'tail' at the expense of warfighting 'teeth.' Want to increase 'boots on the ground?' Eliminate or downsize some of these staffs, don't create more," says this observer.

Many military experts have long advocated paying more attention to Africa. While Central Command has had a small military contingent based in Djibouti (called Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa or 'CJTF-HOA') for several years, intelligence agencies and military officers have warned that the US should be spending more time and money in Africa.

Gen. John Abizaid, the Centcom commander, laid out a laundry list of concerns to the Senate Armed Services Committee last March. While Abizaid spoke about the Horn of Africa, the threats stretch across much of the continent. "The Horn of Africa is vulnerable to penetration by regional extremist groups, terrorist activity, and ethnic violence. Al-Qaeda has a history of planning, training for, and conducting major terrorist attacks in this region, such as the bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The volatility of this region is fueled by a daunting list of challenges, to include extreme poverty, corruption, internal conflicts, border disputes, uncontrolled borders and territorial waters, weak internal security capabilities, natural disasters, famine, lack of dependable water sources, and an underdeveloped infrastructure. The combination of these serious challenges creates an environment that is ripe for exploitation by extremists and criminal organizations."

Abizaid did point out that the small operation in Djibouti has produced bang for the buck: "Working closely with U.S. Embassy personnel in the region, CJTF-HOA assists partner governments in building indigenous capacity to deny terrorists access to their territory. This not only includes training local security and border forces, but also involves assisting with low-level civic projects throughout HOA such as digging wells, building schools and distributing books, and holding medical and veterinary clinics in remote villages." These efforts, Abizaid said, engender goodwill and help "discredit extremist propaganda and bolster local desires and capabilities to defeat terrorists before they can become entrenched."

The Pentagon plans for an African Command

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The U.S. is considering setting up an Africa Command to secure the rear flank of its "global war on terrorism", adding to the five military commands it maintains. Its purpose would be to watch over vital oil reserves and lawless areas where terrorists have sought safe haven to regroup and strike against its interests:

America's Africa Corps

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American military command in Europe General William Ward revealed yesterday about the commitment of Washington to establish a joint military command, instead of being dispersed in three separate bases, to fight terrorism in Africa. He showed concern on the new terrorist alliance announced between Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and Al Qaeda and its renewable strategy. He also talked about the threat on the stability of the region’s countries, especially Algiers.

In a statement to Reuters press agency in Stuttgart, Germany, American General William Ward, second man in the American command in Europe pointed out that the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat lacks training camps but manages special sectors of excellencies gathering fundamentalists from Nigeria, Tunisia and Morocco to train in remote areas for two or three days and that “it is an enemy who has renewable ideas and changes strategies constantly.”

“Our African partners” have better ways of intervention and detention and adapt easily to situations,” he added.

American command in Europe confirms choice of Washington to establish a joint military command in Africa

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The United States has dramatically increased its involvement and arms sales to the Horn of Africa and East Africa in the last three years and plans to consolidate its focus on sub-Saharan Africa by unifying its military command structure.

Senior officials at the Pentagon are said to be in the final stages of work on a proposal to create an Africa Command within the US military, and were expected to present a plan to US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld by the end of this month.

An official who works for the top US military officers says a group in their policy office is working to finalise a proposal to be sent up the chain of command to Secretary Rumsfeld and, if he approves, to President Bush. The official, who requested anonymity because the issue has not been decided, says the group has a deadline of the end of October. Another official described the effort as "tracking fairly quickly," and said Africa Command is "quickly becoming a reality."

Officials say the policy team is working on what one calls a "milestone" proposal developed at Rumsfeld's request by senior officers from European Command, Pacific Command and Central Command, and delivered to the Pentagon two weeks ago. Those three commands now share responsibility for US military activity in Africa.

An official of European Command, which led the effort and has responsibility for most of the continent, says key African "partner nations" were consulted about the idea of establishing an Africa Command, and that they were "very supportive." The official says US embassies on the continent were also consulted.

Secretary Rumsfeld expressed support for the idea of creating an Africa Command during a Town Hall meeting with Pentagon employees last Friday.

"Pete and I are for it and we have been pushing and pushing for six months and trying to get the system to come up with the details as to exactly how it would be done," said Rumsfeld. "Pete" refers to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace.

General Pace also offered support for the idea of an Africa Command, saying that terrorist leaders have expressed their vision for control of much of the world and that more focus on African security should be part of the US response.

"They want to re-establish a caliphate from Spain, all of Europe, Africa, across Asia, Indonesia," said General Pace. "They have said that very plainly. That challenge is there. We need to arrange ourselves in a way to address that challenge, and Africa Command, in my opinion, is a right way to confront part of that problem."

According to information made available to The East African, the unified Africa Military Command will consolidate the current split command structure of the US European Command controlling most of Africa and the Central Command directing US military activities in Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya into a single command.

Besides, direct US arms sales to East Africa and the Horn of Africa countries – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda Uganda and Zambia – have shot up from under one million dollars in 2003 to over $25 million in 2006. Djibouti leads the list with nearly $20 million in direct arms purchases in 2005 and 2006.

Ethiopia also shows a dramatic increase of arms purchases. In 2006, an estimated $8 million worth of weapons will be directly sold and with another $5 million estimated in 2007. This is an increase from only $250,000 in 2005 and $750,000 in 2003.

Weapons sales by authorised private weapon companies, like the recently accused Select Armor, says a report in defenselink.mil/news/ website run by the State Department, have also soared. Figures recently released by the Department show that private arms sales will hit an all time high of an estimated $9.5 million in 2007, which is down from a 2005 high of nearly $15 million. Uganda leads this list with nearly $9 million in purchases from US authorised private arms dealers, and Djibouti once again hits near the top of the list with nearly $6 million in purchases in 2005 and 2006.

Uganda’s purchase of weapons through private companies like Select Armor, may be significant in light of a recent article by Africa Confidential that claimed US and Kampala-based Select Armor was being used to funnel weapons to Somalia’s government in their fight against the Islamic Courts Union. According to the reports, Select Armor promised to provide end user certificates as part of their service, which if true, may violate the current UN arms embargo on Somalia.

Overall, direct US weapons sales increased from $39.2 million in 2005 to nearly $60 million in 2006. In both years, East Africa and the Horn accounted for nearly 40 percent of US weapons sales to Africa, and this demonstrates the US military’s strategic shift to the region.

The United States has also increased its Djibouti’s counter terrorism base. The Special Operations Combined Joint Task Force at Camp Lemonier has grown from 800 soldiers in 2003 to 1,800 today.

Access to strategic airfields and ports has also increased for the US military. Beyond Camp Lemonier in 2003, the US had an agreement with Kenya that allowed it access to the port of Mombasa and airfields at Embakasi and Nanyuki. Since then the US has extended its regional influence with "cooperative security locations" that provide basing structures for regional operations when needed.

Zambia and Uganda have joined Kenya in this unique arrangement. At Entebbe, the US has constructed two K-Span steel buildings to house troops and equipment. The so called "Lily Pad" arrangement will allow the US military to use the base when needed in times of conflict or as a staging area for a conflict within the region. They are bare bone facilities surrounding an airstrip with installed communications equipment and warehoused supplies. Many times these facilities are manned by local soldiers, which lowers the US footprint but still provides security.

Strategically, the US military has developed a regional operations plan that centres on Djibouti to support the Horn countries. It anchors the southern flank with bases in Kenya, Zambia and Uganda to the west.

The US strategy in East Africa and the Horn is strategically positioned in two areas. First, it can immediately assist Kenya if the fighting in Somalia spills over into Northern Kenya.

For the past month, a steady stream of Somalia refuges have crossed into Kenya challenging the drought stricken region further and increasing tensions between Kenya and Somalia.

Second, like in Nigeria, it can be used to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil from the newly discovered fields of Uganda and Kenya, and it opens the door to the construction of a well-protected oil pipeline carrying oil for the interior of Central Africa to the port of Mombasa. It also provides a strategically located airbase to support future military operations to the north in Sudan or to the west.

The expansion of the US military influence in the Horn of Africa is counter balanced by a growing French presence in Chad and the Central African Republic. France has increased its troop numbers in both countries to fight a growing rebellion in the region. Recent reports describe a rapid French military build-up in Chad with the arrival of 600 French mercenaries, four attack helicopters, and 12 Brazilian-made tanks at the end of September.

The Great Lakes Centre for Strategic Studies (GLCSS) believes the French and US military build-up may be part of a unified Sub-Saharan strategy. Both countries currently co-operate in Djibouti in a resource sharing arrangement. In the last two years, the United States has aided the French-backed Chad government in the fight against Algerian Salafist guerrillas operating in Chad.

In 2004, the US flew a P3 Orion surveillance aircraft from a base in Southern Algeria over Northern Chad. The intelligence from those flights was fed to the Chadian forces fighting the Salafist group.

Although there are indications that US arms sales to Africa may be drastically reduced in 2007, this appears to be highly unlikely considering the increased fighting in Somalia and an unstable situation in Sudan. If the Sudan government is destabilised over the international confrontation in Darfur, the repercussions for the region, and Sudan, will be drastic and fuel an increased influx of weapons to the region.

U.S. plans to scale up military presence in the Horn of Africa

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Algeria has declined to host the headquarter of the United State's Africa Command (Africom) which the pentagon is planning to create this year, the Algerian Daily la Jeune Independant reported on Wednesday.

The decision made by the Algerian government conforms to the principles which are against hosting foreign forces on its territory, according to the daily.

Following Algeria's refusal, America could request either Mali or Niger to host Africom headquarters, said the daily.

The Africom would oversee strategic developments and military operations across the entire continent, said the Pentagon.

Some observers estimate that the Americans are using this approach to boost their presence in Africa apart from the strengthening of the fight against terrorism.

Algeria declines to host U.S. African command: report

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In the post-September 11, 2001, world it is thoroughly understandable that the United States should reorganize its military, diplomatic, and military resources to engage, understand, and, if required, contest militant Islam. Since those tragic events in 2001, Washington has initiated wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; it has seized "enemy combatants," and has detained and interrogated them at Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba and other clandestine locations around the world; and it has radically reformed domestic terrorism laws in an effort to detect, deter, and destroy enemies of the country. But is the strategy comprehensive, or is it overly skewed toward military initiatives without taking into account measures that are needed to win the "soft war" of educating the minds and nurturing the bodies of putative enemies of the US?

My contention is that military investments are necessary and can be prudent. However, American investments in education and healthcare overseas, which are equally important in this "soft war," seem to be unsatisfactorily under-funded by the Bush administration.

Since September 11 and the apparent permanent reversal of American military fortunes in the war in Iraq, it has become abundantly clear to petroleum analysts around the world that the Middle East, which serves the world as a critical source for oil and natural gas, is either unstable, at risk, or inaccessible for investment and exploitation. Saudi Arabia, the world's largest depository of petroleum reserves, survives for the moment, yet it suffers from internal dissension and the possibility of the eventual demise of the Al-Saud regime.

Iraq, thanks to its significant sources of petroleum in the Basra area, may sell the product to world consumers, but that source is irregular and because of its location may eventually fall under the tutelage of Iranian political or economic forces. Meanwhile, America's consistent failure to engage in diplomacy with Iran since 1979 means that China has primary access to petroleum there. Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi all are protected by an American military umbrella meaning that - at least for the moment - these sources of petroleum are comparatively secure.

The general lack of security in the Middle East means that the US and other consumers of petroleum must necessarily look toward Africa for alternate sources of petroleum. Indonesia and Russia may also serve as providers to Western markets but, given the proximity of the west coast of Africa to Western European and American markets, Africa's petroleum necessarily must be considered an alternative to Middle Eastern oil. It also happens to be in Africa that petroleum and Islam mix.

Because of the instability in the Middle East, the US has come up with a military strategy to deal with the question of Islamic terrorism and the protection of petroleum assets in Africa. To cite just one example of this reorientation in strategy, in May 2003 the NATO supreme commander, General James Jones, said that the US Navy's Sixth Fleet that is based in Naples, Italy, would eventually "[s]pend half the time going down the west coast of Africa." So Africa has become a critical area of geopolitical concern for reasons of religious activism and petroleum.

The US has two plans for military joint training operations on the African continent. The first is the Global Peace Operations Initiative begun during fiscal year 2006. That initiative provided $100.4 million in FY 2006 and requested $102.6 million for FY 2007 to train and equip battalions and specialty units in Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Mali, Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, Gabon and Nigeria. The amount involved here is very modest. On average the amount dedicated per country averages close to $800,000 per recipient.

Of more direct interest to the subject here is the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which is an outgrowth of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). The PSI was started right after September 11 and spent approximately $16 million during 2002-2003 to deploy teams of Special Operations soldiers to Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to provide counter-terrorism training and equipment. The big media coup in this initiative occurred when militants of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Chad were tracked down during 2004.

The TSCTI received $3 million in funding during FY 2005 and was scheduled to receive $100 million yearly from FY 2007 through FY 2011, resulting in a total of $500 million. Troops to be trained under this program would include Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia.

It is clear that this new program in its expanded form takes cognizance of the double nexus between maintaining state stability and security and maintaining access to petroleum and natural gas sources. The inclusion of Algeria, Nigeria and Tunisia and the design of the new military training program prove that US Department of Defense planners understand the need to be engaged both militarily and socially in these key countries. The new program is multi-departmental, involving the State Department in airport security, the Treasury Department in money laundering and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in educational and health programs. What is clear from a review of the new program is that the military engagement, or "the hard power," is clearly there. What is equally clear is that the "soft power," or the need to address the question of education and healthcare, is not well funded.....

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In this new security arrangement, Algeria is the biggest "winner." Besides the military training received, the country has been able to purchase $276 million in armaments from the US government during 2005 alone. In addition, Algeria has purchased $6.1 million in armaments from private markets. The second largest beneficiary from these changes in American policy has been Morocco. In 2005 it was able to purchase $18 million in armaments from the US government and $3.9 million in private markets.

US government arms purchases by the other beneficiary countries in these programs have been paltry. The emergence of Algeria as a key player in these new security arrangements may speak volumes about future American-Algerian cooperation. If we were to simply "follow the money," we would have to assume that Algeria and the United States may have a newly meaningful and enhanced military, intelligence, and diplomatic relationship.

Regarding the "soft" aspect of this analysis, this is the area where much greater attention and funding are warranted. Ultimately, it will be new educational systems and enhanced healthcare delivery systems that will convert the enemies of America into friends. It would seem that a modest investment in educational and healthcare initiatives would reap substantial benefits. Upon a review of USAID programs for the countries discussed here, however, it seems that "soft investment" is missing.

For example, in Mali USAID program expenditure for FY 2007 is budgeted to amount to just under $32 million, to be spread over healthcare, basic education, governance, economic growth and communications projects. During the same period and on the same programs, USAID has budgeted less than $19 million for Nigeria. There is nothing for Chad, Mauritania or Niger.

In other words, with the exception of Mali, sufficient funds have not been made available for basic education and healthcare in at least four critical countries. This is due to either poor planning or poor execution of policy - especially given what we already know about the ameliorative effect that these kinds of initiatives have on positive public perceptions of the US. Why the military aspect of this anti-terrorist initiative in the Sahel has been funded while the non-military programs have been neglected is difficult to comprehend.

Beyond the lack of balance in the appropriations for "hard" and "soft" initiatives, the other aspect that seems to be at least somewhat misguided is that most of the military training has taken place in the Sahara Desert. The expenditure of $500 million over a five-year period may be entirely appropriate if the center of gravity for the Islamist movement were located in the desert. Quite evidently, that is not the case. Militant Islamism is an urban phenomenon. In urban areas, educational systems are often under-funded and directed by Islamists (often with Saudi Arabian, Moroccan or Libyan support).

Improving standards of hygiene and medical care would improve relations between the US and the residents of beneficiary countries. In Niger, for example, Cuba has sent hundreds of doctors who have helped improve healthcare there by reforming hygienic methods and providing rudimentary medicines. How can Cuba afford to send hundreds of doctors to Niger while the United States cannot? Can Washington afford not to?

Beyond the provision of educational and medical support in urban areas, the last missing element in this effort to detect and monitor militant Islamism involves the need to collect basic intelligence or information regarding the socio-economic causes for militant Islamism. At least from the public information that is available, it seems that the United States has a limited presence on the ground in urban environments where Islamists live and recruit. It would seem that an almost immediate investment in human intelligence gathering capabilities is needed in places like Kano and Lagos in Nigeria, Abidjan in Ivory Coast, Monrovia in Liberia, Freetown in Sierra Leone, and Dakar in Senegal.

Finally, one has to underscore that the traditional forms of Islam that have been practiced in Africa over centuries (especially variants of Sufi Islam) have never posed a security risk to the interests of the United States. It is only one smaller, more violent variant of militant Islam that needs regular surveillance and counter-measures. This violent form of Islam finds political expression because real and legitimate frustrations exist in many Muslim communities regarding failed educational systems, sub-standard healthcare delivery systems, high rates of infant mortality, and endemic poverty.

It seems that while the US must continue with its investment in military programs, to avoid the "soft power" alternatives that are both available and inexpensive would seem to work only to the detriment of American security.

America in Africa: addressing a mix of Islam and oil