32. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson

/1/ Washington, December 22, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous,
7/65-11/68. Secret. SUBJECT

Food for Algeria

After much soul-searching, Secretary Rusk recommends a PL 480 Title IV dollar
sale of 200,000 tons of wheat to Algeria (attached)./2/ Last February you
approved a similar sale. But except for that and a little continuing
technical assistance ($125,000), our program in Algeria has been on dead
center ever since because of Algeria's vociferous opposition to our position
in Viet Nam.

/2/Attached but not printed.

These political problems remain because the Algerians can't dissociate their
own revolutionary experience from what is going on in Viet Nam today, no
matter how often we point out the differences. The large buildup of Soviet
weapons there also upsets our friends in Morocco and Tunisia. But if it were
not for Viet Nam, we'd be on relatively good terms with this government. It
has not caused trouble elsewhere in Africa, and its interests do not cross
ours anywhere. Despite these political differences, we still face the fact
that Algeria is potentially one of the half-dozen African powers of tomorrow.


When its government becomes more effective, its oil revenues could underwrite
substantial development from the already good French base. Its successful
revolution gives it the credentials of leadership among the Afro-Asian
nations. Its population and army will be among Africa's largest and
strongest. The main question is whether we want to play for a continuing role
there despite its unfriendly public attitude on Viet Nam. The Soviets and
French are making a major play for Algeria and would be glad to see us drop
out. So far our food has been our blue chip in this game. Now, we must decide
whether we will ante up for another round. Secretary Rusk on balance thinks
we should go ahead. Averell Harriman--just back from Algeria--says: "I feel
the Algerian government is worth cultivating. Nothing is to be gained by
accentuating our differences. They may be helpful in finding a peaceful
solution to Vietnam." (His fuller report on his talks in Algeria is attached
to Secretary Rusk's memo.)

/3/ /3/See Document 31 and footnote 1 thereto.

Apart from the politics, the North Africans suffered a severe drought this
year, and Algeria estimated its need at slightly over 900,000 tons of grain.
They've bought 500,000 tons (400,000 in the US) for cash, and the Soviet
Union has offered 200,000. This leaves a gap of slightly over 200,000 which
Secretary Rusk recommends we fill. He would like to go ahead in the next few
days so we can negotiate a new agreement before 31 December. First, while
Algerian supplies probably would carry the government into the early spring,
we have CIA reports indicating that it feels it must make its own
arrangements to cover the rest of the gap in the next few weeks for political
reasons. Second, he would like to avoid your having to make a
determination--which you've objected to but which will be required under the
new legislation beginning 1 January--that it's in the national interest to
aid Algeria despite its trade in non-strategic goods with Cuba. It will also
be easier to negotiate an agreement with the Algerians under the present
legislation than under the new because we are not in any position to discuss
changes in its own agricultural practices unless we can expand our technical
help. I have to admit I'm torn.

I recognize the pain Algeria causes us on Viet Nam, but it's not in a
position to do us much positive harm or good. I also know that rushing to
beat the 31 December deadline may not square with your own strenuous effort
to shift the food program to harder terms. However, the Algerians have
suffered drought and have already bought almost half their requirements here
for hard cash, and this concessional sale is repayable in dollars. Therefore,
I recommend looking at this primarily in Algerian terms and lean toward
keeping a foot in the door as long as we can do it with mostly dollar sales
and a little technical aid.

/4/ /4/On February 4, 1967, Rusk sent a follow-up memorandum to the
President, urging him to approve the recommendations in his December 20
memorandum. The Secretary said that U.S. lack of response to the Algerian
request for P.L. 480 assistance in a year of serious drought was being
interpreted by Algeria as an indication of systematic political hostility and
might lead it to pursue more radical foreign policies. He argued that it was
important that the United States maintain enough of a stake in Algeria to
forestall complete Soviet domination. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 20)

Walt Approve Title IV sale and current technical assistance level
Disapprove
Let's talk

/5/ /5/None of these opinions is checked.