National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 62-64

Washington, December 23, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 1962, Algeria. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on December 23, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

ALGERIA

The Problem

To assess the situation in Algeria, and to estimate its prospects over the next two years or so.

Conclusions

A. We think that Ben Bella's chances of remaining in power for the next two years or so are good. He will probably continue to keep a narrow but fairly solid power base, especially in the military establishment, where Vice President and Minister of Defense Boumedienne appears loyal. We do not believe that Boumedienne would use the army to oust Ben Bella, except under extraordinary conditions. (Paras. 13, 24-25)

B. The economy will probably continue to decline for a time, and will probably stabilize at a lower level than at present. We do not believe that the economic situation will deteriorate so far as to generate extreme political discontent. The majority of the people will follow the traditional subsistence agricultural pattern, while the new society of politically important elements, including the army, bureaucracy, and workers on nationalized farms, is likely to continue to fare better than under the French. (Paras. 16, 24, 28)

C. The 60,000 man Algerian military establishment has been largely re-equipped with Soviet weapons in the past year or so. It can maintain internal security and is improving vis-a-vis its most likely external rival, Morocco. In about a year it will probably be superior to the Moroccans. However, while Algerian-Moroccan relations are likely to remain uneasy, a recurrence of major hostilities is unlikely. (Paras. 11, 14-15, 41)

D. Algeria will probably move away, albeit slowly and haphazardly, from its close linkage with France, and the latter's aid will almost certainly decline after 1965, when the nuclear test sites will no longer be needed. French interests, especially oil, as well as Algeria's need for financial aid, will militate against a complete break. The coming years are likely to be marked by continued frictions, however, as Algeria strives to reduce its dependence without losing the benefits of the association, but a major breach will probably be avoided at least as long as de Gaulle lives. (Paras. 31-32)

E. Algeria's revolutionary convictions lead it to support virtually any movement bearing the anti-colonialist label. In Africa particularly, Ben Bella will provide moral support, as well as arms and training, to revolutionary movements, often in concert with Soviet and Chinese actions. This already conflicts with US policies in sub-Saharan Africa and would be especially serious if a rebel movement were to develop the staying power to wage a drawn-out guerrilla conflict. In any event, US-Algerian relations are likely to be marked by growing frictions. (Paras. 29, 36-39)

F. Both Soviets and Chinese appear to regard the Ben Bella regime as promoting their respective interests by its predilection for supporting revolutionary movements. While this condition obtains and at least as long as French assistance and presence remain strong, the USSR and China will be content to play a background role, although continuing to provide economic aid. A major breach between France and Algeria could open the way for greatly increased Soviet influence. However, the Soviets would be faced with problems, as well as opportunities, especially since providing budget support would break a precedent and also be very costly. (Paras. 34-35)

[Here follows the "Discussion" section of the Estimate.]



17. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Secret.

The attached is one of the most interesting dispatches I have seen in recent months./2/ It shows our Ambassador, William Porter, in a straight out talk with Ben Bella. Bearing in mind that one man is a head of government and the other is a diplomat, I think you will agree that Porter did an astonishing job of stating his case while maintaining communication with his target. He also surprised Ben Bella into unusual frankness about his attitudes.

/2/Not attached.

Finally, in his concluding section, Porter shows that he is not a bit taken in by Ben Bella and understands precisely how B.B. is playing into the hands of the Soviets--not because he is a Communist, but because of his own fanatical emotions.

The policy question we face, of course, is whether it helps to cut off PL-480 to a man like this. My own estimate, which the intelligence community shares, is that as a matter of cold national interest it would do us no good--in the sense that it would not bring Ben Bella "to his senses" and would only confirm him in his fundamental emotional convictions. Cutting off Algeria would also play right into Soviet hands. It's precisely what Moscow would like us to do.

On the other hand, food does not buy his friendship, and if it is politically very unpopular here, it should be cut back gradually in ways that are not visibly connected to his foreign policy. Ben Bella, unlike Nasser, has done us no injury within his own territories--at least so far.

What we currently have is a freeze on discussion of new projects with Ben Bella, and I think this is right for the present.

One more point about this message is that it does show Porter's own quality. He has been under something of a cloud at the State Department for reasons which I do not understand, and unless you disagree I plan to put in a plug for him over there.

McG. B./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.