Bring us sugar!

[Al-khiyal]

[Al-khiyal]

[Felicity]

I watched the first one with my husband last night, but haven't watched the second yet. Thank you Al-Khiyal, you always find the best videos

[Al-khiyal]

Algeria's national 'protesta'

The massive wave of protests that have engulfed Algeria and the recent unrest in Tunisia are both premised on a fundamental political deficit - the absence of credible political institutions capable of ensuring adequate representation of the society and so keeping the executive branch of the state under the kind of critical observation and pressure necessary to good government. It has been widely suggested that the riots have been food or hunger riots, in that they were supposedly triggered by the steep increases in the prices of staple goods, notably sugar and olive oil. These increases were not decreed by the government; the private sector traders appear to have raised prices of their own accord, in reaction to the government's attempts to impose new regulations on their transactions. The government's decision was, in principle, part of the necessary and long overdue attempt to curb the rampant informal sector of the economy by subjecting the trade in foodstuffs to basic regulation and so bring it back into the formal sector. But if so, the government has clearly had no conception of the political difficulty and magnitude of this task and seems to have supposed that it could effect changes of this nature by simple ministerial fiat.

But there can be little doubt that the price increases were simply the last straw. The greater part of Algerian society has been in a permanent state of moral revolt against the regime for the last four or five years. In particular, riots have been a frequent - one might well say a regular - feature of the Algerian political landscape for the last decade, since the massive and protracted riots in Kabylia, the main Berber region, in 2001. Since 2005, scarcely a fortnight has gone by without a riot somewhere in the country. The immediate motives have varied from case to case but have usually been connected to the state's failings as a distributive state. In January 2005, numerous communities across the country rioted over the steep increase - in the depths of winter - in the price of butane gas on which households depended for heating. The allocation of new public housing by local authorities has frequently been contested by the unlucky claimants, with angry demonstrations, accusing mayors of nepotism and corruption, often turning into bitter affrays. At other times, many villages and even entire municipalities have rioted as the last resort, having despaired of attracting the regional authorities' attention to their particular, long-neglected needs, whatever these might be (water supply, electrification, repair of the only road, a decent school or clinic) by more orderly procedures.

What all these forms of riotous assembly over the years have had in common is the visceral refusal of la hogra - the arrogance and contempt with which the authorities at all levels routinely treat ordinary Algerians. At the same time, these varied resorts to direct action have universally expressed the Algerian public's disenchantment with the political parties and institutions established since the introduction of formal political pluralism in 1989. Public opinion long ago concluded that these formal institutions have nothing to offer them, that the last thing they can expect is for the deputies in the National Assembly, of whatever party, to represent them to any effect - first because the parliament has no real power, and second because deputies' elections depend on their position in party lists in vast constituencies and in the circumstances are effectively insulated against the exasperation of their own electors, and are under no pressure to do anything for them. So the Algerians in their majority have learned the hard way that direct action - making a nuisance of themselves to the authorities in one way or another - is the only tactic that works. And rioting has accordingly become both a running popular commentary on the political status quo and the spuriousness of its pretensions to be a modern state (let alone one animated by democratic principles and subject to the rule of law) and a way of getting things done and thus, ironically, a kind of buttress of the same status quo insofar as this kind of local-level, single-issue rioting is manageable and has become routinised.

What is important about the events of the last few days, therefore, is that we have seen the national proclivity to riot taken to the next level. In place of serial rioting, the Algerians have managed to riot all over the country virtually simultaneously. The speed with which the movement spread from the first incidents in Oran and Algiers on January 5 has been very impressive. This is, among other things, an index of the existence in Algeria today of a genuinely national consciousness, however threadbare and vacuous the official ‘nationalism' of the governing elites. But it has also had ominous implications. As early as January 6, El Watan, the national daily traditionally seen as close to the army commanders, was warning of a remake of "October," that is the traumatic riots in 1988 in which hundreds were killed after the army commanders imposed a State of Siege and troops opened fire on unarmed youths in numerous cities. But it is arguably the way in which the latest riots have differed from "October" that has been significant. While they have been far wider and more genuinely national in scope, the army has not acted; no state of siege has been declared. The Police, and occasionally the gendarmerie, have been responsible for coping with the unrest. They have, so far, exercised restraint and have undoubtedly been ordered to do so. Although several hundred people (rioters, police and gendarmes combined) have been injured, only three deaths have been reported so far, in massive contrast to the toll in 1988. We have not yet seen the end of this affair, however.

At this point the eventual political outcome of this national dust-up is quite unclear. The government on Saturday announced measures to get the price rises cancelled, which scratches only the surface of the problem. It has already been relying on the imams (religious leaders) to calm things down and may well seek to avoid taking any political initiatives, because it is probably incapable, as things stand, of envisaging a deeper reform of the sort that is definitely needed. But it should be noted that the rioters virtually everywhere have proved incapable of articulating intelligible political demands and have been acting in radical disconnection from Algeria's political parties, but also - unlike the Tunisian protesters - without any links to or help from the trade union movement or other organized associations. Certain senior regime figures, in admonishing the rioters for their violence (stoning passing cars and the police, looting offices, ransacking public agencies, etc.) have called on them to "demonstrate peacefully," apparently forgetting that the State of Emergency in force since 1992 expressly forbids public demonstrations of any kind and that such peaceful demonstrations as have been staged - by Algeria's teachers, by the mothers of the "disappeared" - have been regularly dispersed with sickening brutality. The Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDH) has called for the repeal of the Emergency Law, as has the Socialist Forces Front (FFS). But this is only one of the reforms that are badly needed and the failure of the opposition parties to intervene with appropriate demands at this point has been very striking. It is therefore uncertain how this huge outburst of negative energy will be harnessed and exploited politically. That is probably the next chapter in this story and it remains to be written.

[karolina]

im wondering how is situation in algeria now. is there any views for better future? any changes?
is there any oppositions to the goverment? and leader who could lead ppl to make changes but in peaceful way?
its really sad that so big and rich country is full of fools, corruption and bureaucracy.

[Al-khiyal]

[Al-khiyal]

Algeria's rioters may not rest for long

After several days of rioting earlier this month, the Algerian government decided to cut the cost of some staple foods, such as sugar, cooking oil and flour. It also said that import duties on sugar, cooking oil and other foodstuffs will be reduced. This will cost the treasury 23 billion dinars (£193 million) in lost customs duty, but it is only for a period of eight months – and while the situation is calm now, there will be more trouble if prices are increased again. The recent rioting has many of the hallmarks of the 1988 "bread revolt". The difference between now and then is that in 1988, Algeria was heavily in debt and now it is a rich country with bank reserves of $160 billion, thanks to oil and gas revenue. But people are not benefiting from huge gas and oil revenues.

A few weeks ago, there were protests in Algiers about social housing. The government promised to build more homes, but this will take many years to do. Last November, the authorities issued statements through the press to the fact that prices of essential goods would increase and that tax would be levied on the wholesale companies. This, in turn, forced the wholesale companies to increase the cost of all foodstuffs. What is amazing is that the government planned this increase several months ago and the regime seems to be out of touch with the grassroots. The regime simply wanted to control the lives of people in its own way. On 11 January, several political parties, independent trade unions and important personalities appealed to the government to lift the state of emergency and allow more political and press freedom and the establishment of associations of civil societies. They said the latest revolt was "clearly a failure of the last 50 years of the government". The interior minister, Daho Ould Kablia, accused the signatories of being irresponsible.

This latest revolt had been expected since the presidential election of April 2009, which Abdelaziz Bouteflika won with 90.25%, despite a massive boycott by the electorate. As a result, there was a complete breakdown in trust between politicians and citizens. Many of this ruling elite have been in power since independence, while many of the new highly qualified elite have left the country. With very high unemployment, particularly among the young and university graduates, the cost of living doubling within a few weeks, uncontrolled inflation and a political situation that is completely blocked, many Algerians have given up hope and would pay any price to join smugglers' boats to Europe.

Since September 2009, rumours began to spread about Bouteflika's health and new elections. Many observers noticed that Boutaflika no longer seems to control events in the country. His health remains a state secret and this has caused many Algerians to worry about the future. The personal ambition of Said Bouteflika to succeed his brother as president has increased unhappiness among Algerians. Other political leaders who want to succeed Bouteflika are: Abdelaziz Belkhadem, a hardliner and secretary-general of the ruling FLN party, and Ahmed Ouyahia, the present prime minister, who is been seen by European and U.S. diplomats as the best technocrat. Since Bouteflika became president in 1999, he has not introduced any measures that might improve the freedom of assembly, of the press, or the protection of human rights. Any democratic transformation of the country was prevented by his obsession with maintaining control by the use of classical socialist ideological methods imposed by the late president Houari Boumédienne.

Algerian political parties are ideologically split over fundamental reforms. Those in favour are too weak to implement any change. Civil society is not allowed to flourish. The ruling elite pays no attention to people's wellbeing and thinks the leadership has been elected to last for ever. Last June, Bouteflika appointed a new cabinet and for the first time he created a new post of deputy prime minister for his old friend, Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni, who was the interior minister before the reshuffle. However, last September, according to my sources, Zerhouni asked Bouteflika to consider an early retirement (friendly advice, one would think). Next day, he was told not to come to the Council of Ministers meeting and since then has not been seen around the president. What will Bouteflika do now? Aged 74 and in poor health, is he capable of taking decisions and the country forward, given the struggle for succession within his cabinet? During the last protest, Algerians were demanding more respect, jobs, freedom and no more of the iron fist. The regime has succeeded in calming the situation for now, but without serious reforms, for how long? There remains the risk that trouble will begin again – especially in view of the uprising in Tunisia next door.