There are always parties who are ready to exploit tense relations between two neighboring countries. In the case of Morocco and Algeria, there are calls and wishes to solve the Sahara dispute according to the viewpoints of the two main countries, Morocco and the Polisario Front; and the two observing countries, Algeria and Mauritania.

Never has Algeria been so outraged as when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted his recent report to the Security Council to solve the current predicament. The report, which was approved, calls on the two parties and the region's countries to fully cooperate.

Meanwhile, British State Minister Kim Howells encouraged the two neighboring countries to set aside their differences, giving good tidings of the détente's achievements for Morocco, Algeria and the region. This means that the logic of benefiting from the deterioration of such relations, as well as any other differences or tension, ebbs tide in face of the advantages that can be gained with reconciliation.

Coming to a dead end caused the two countries and the region to lose many opportunities for reconciliation, to the extent that separating the Sahara dispute from other hovering issues (such as the reopening of borders and activating the Maghreb union) did not help in filling the gaps of divergence. Furthermore, any attempt from either of the two countries to impose a certain vision regarding the issue's background and its legal, historical and political considerations, remained tedious and lacked confidence.

It seems that the UN's role in this respect cannot exceed the level of simmering down the escalation, due to its point of reference being to reach as much agreement as possible on any formula that provides a solution. So long as divergence is great, the course of action inclines toward not achieving such agreement. After the conflict between the two neighbors had been based on a contradiction between two models of options and ideological loyalties during the Cold War era, it turned into a clash between two viewpoints of solution after the upsurge of the Sahara conflict. Morocco has become reassured that it would regain the territory occupied by Spain in the past, but it failed to conciliate all the Saharan inhabitants. Algeria could have attracted some of them, but it failed to gain a foothold there. This intensified the Sahara problem - where the cup is only half full. The paradox in such a conflict is that it has not been resolved militarily, because its political dimension has also not been resolved. This can be attributed to the fact that its military dimension will not exceed the validity of a ceasefire sponsored by the UN.

The light at the end of the tunnel is far off because the problem could turn into an inter-Saharan issue. Even though Chairman of the Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs Khali Henna Ould Errachid announces that the Sahara issue is an inter-Morocco one, he does not revive the old idea of Morocco's rejection of any interference in its internal affairs, but rather raises the 'third voice' which was overlooked. Morocco has its own Sahara with its own geography and Saharans. Algeria also has its own Saharans, but it does not matter whether they are involved in or divided from the Polisario Front. More importantly, this is a fact. While Morocco cannot disregard the existence of Sahara descendents that are outside its political influence, Algeria can also not disregard the existence of pro-Morocco Saharans. The gravest mistake here might lie in the fact that the pattern of conflict has not aided either of them to have the most influential role.

When the UN made an autonomy referendum, it was unable to identify the eligible voters. The recorded data of demography in Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania was not the only obstacle: the process would definitely have led to a winner and a loser. When UN Mediator James Baker attempted to combine the two formulas of autonomy and referendum, he eventually had to wash his hands of the matter. It is likely that Kofi Annan, the fourth UN Secretary-General to deal with this conflict, is relying on the breakthrough made by the 'third voice'. This will be in case negotiations turn into a give-and-take situation between the Saharans themselves, which may spare Morocco and Algeria the trouble of any embarrassment. Replacement of terminology may be useful in changing stances, not positions.

Morocco, Algeria and lost opportunities