Q & A: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

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Introduction

Reports from North Africa point to a recent resurgence in terrorist activity by several local Islamist movements, the most prominent of which is the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). An Algeria-based Sunni group that recently renamed itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the organization has taken responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks in the region, declared its intention to attack Western targets, and sent a squad of jihadis to Iraq. Experts believe these actions suggest widening ambitions within the group’s leadership, now pursuing a more global, sophisticated and better-financed direction. Long categorized as part of a strictly domestic insurgency against Algeria’s military government, GSPC claims to be the local franchise operation for al-Qaeda, a worrying development for a region which has been relatively peaceful since the bloody Algerian civil war of the 1990s drew to a close.

What is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?

The group originated as an armed Islamist resistance movement to the secular Algerian government. Its insurrection began after Algeria’s military regime canceled the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992 after it became clear the Islamic Salvation Front, a coalition of Islamist militants and moderates, might win and take power. The GSPC declared its independence from another insurgent group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1998, believing the GIA’s brutal tactics were hurting the Islamist cause. The GSPC gained support from the Algerian population by vowing to continue fighting while foreswearing the indiscriminate killing of civilians. The group has since surpassed the GIA in influence and numbers to become the primary force for Islamism in Algeria, with the majority of its members refusing government offers of amnesty after Algeria’s civil war of the mid-1990s. According to a 2005 U.S. State Department report (.pdf) on terrorism, its ranks have dwindled to only a few hundred from nearly 28,000 at the height of its power.

What’s the connection between GSPC and al-Qaeda?

Collusion between the GSPC and al-Qaeda is not a new phenomenon. According to a report by Emily Hunt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Osama bin Laden provided funding for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and was involved in the GSPC’s early formation. Many of the group’s founding members trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The GSPC declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda as early as 2003, but al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahari, officially approved GSPC’s merger in a videotape released on September 11, 2006. The GSPC claimed responsibility for February 2007 attacks against Algerian police stations under its new name.

What are GSPC’s goals?

Originally, its aims included the overthrow of Algeria’s secular, military government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, a theocracy based on Islamic law that for twelve centuries spanned the Muslim world. Counterterrorism experts, however, say the group’s folding into the global al-Qaeda structure may indicate a shift to take up the banner of global jihad and collude on future attacks in North Africa, Western Europe, and Iraq. “Pressed by Algerian counterterrorism successes, the once Algeria-centric GSPC has become a regional terrorist organization, recruiting and operation all throughout the Maghreb—and beyond to Europe itself,” said Harry Crumpton, the U.S. ambassador at large for counterterrorism, during an April 2006 Senate testimony (.pdf). In a January speech, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, the GSPC commander, declared solidarity (.pdf) with Islamists in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, Somalia and Chechnya.

Hugh Roberts, head of the International Crisis Group’s North Africa project, says it’s too early to tell if its new allegiance to al-Qaeda will shift its mission statement or operational strategies to take on an international role beyond Algeria’s borders. “We need to wait and see is if it starts operating as a regional attachment of the global jihad,” he says. “Plenty of people are worried that it’s going to do this. So far we haven’t really seen it.”

What are the group’s tactics?

The GSPC employs conventional terrorist tactics (.pdf) to achieve its objectives in Algeria, including guerilla-style ambushes against military personnel and truck bombs against government targets, according to the Center for Policing Terrorism (CPT) at the Manhattan Institute. GSPC militants kidnapped thirty-two European tourists traveling in the Algerian Sahara in February 2003. Money from the kidnapped victims’ ransom is alleged to have purchased surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning equipment. In December 2006, the group attacked two buses carrying contractors near Algiers, wounding several foreign nationals.

It’s a move that some experts say may indicate a new willingness to target Westerners both inside and outside Algeria. The GSPC has also taken over, and some say revitalized, many of the Europe-based cells of the former GIA both for the purpose of fundraising and for launching attacks.....

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Is the group capable of carrying out global attacks?

Analysts point to thwarted attacks in France and several arrests of GSPC-linked groups as evidence the group is capable of attacks in Western Europe. Authorities arrested a London-based GSPC militant who conspired to launch a chemical attack, and arrested four members of a GSPC cell in Frankfurt for possession of chemicals and arms. In spite of this, some experts doubt their ability to carry out an al-Qaeda-scale attack. “They haven’t done anything spectacular,” says Roberts. “They have not actually pulled off a single terrorist attack in Europe in the eight years they’ve existed. And that’s a fact that you have to put in balance against European security services that say the group is a major threat.”

Who are the group’s main leaders?

After the 1979-1989 jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, hundreds of North African volunteers known as “Afghan Arabs” returned to the region and radicalized Islamist movements in North Africa. Most of the group’s main leaders are believed to have trained in Afghanistan. Within Algeria, leadership is essentially divided into northern and southern groups.

Abu Musab Abdulwadood. The current chief of the northern group, also known as Abdelmalek Droukdel, is a former university science student turned bomb maker. He has led the group since September 2004 after the previous leader, Nabil Sahraoui, was killed in a firefight with Algerian forces in June of that year.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Known as the "One-eyed," Belmokhtar is a former Algerian soldier who spent time fighting in Afghanistan. He allegedly joined the group through his role as the leader of a smuggling gang, which subsequently joined the GSPC. According to Hunt’s report, his family connections allow the group to capitalize on criminal opportunities in the South, such as smuggling. He was reportedly killed in northern Mali, but Algerian authorities have yet to confirm his death.

Ammari Saifi. Also known as Abderrazak the Para, because he was trained as an Algerian special forces paratrooper, Saifi organized the 2003 kidnapping of European tourists in the Algerian Sahara. He was known as the “Bin Laden of the desert” and designated as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the United States, a classification shared by top al-Qaeda commanders before he was captured by a Chadian rebel group, the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJC) and eventually extradited to Algeria.

Where does the group receive its funding?

Smuggling and petty crimes are a lucrative source of income, according to the CPT report. The porous, un-policed borders of the Sahara region make smuggling vehicles, cigarettes, drugs, and arms particularly easy. The organization’s operatives in Europe may provide new forms of income through theft and document forgery carried out by new recruits, according to the report. The ransom paid as a result of the 2003 kidnapping also provided a significant windfall for the group. Algerian authorities accuse Iran and Sudan of giving material support to the GSPC, but experts say such support is unlikely.

Does the recent name change represent a resurgence of the GSPC?

Algeria-watchers are divided as to whether it signifies a new resurgence of Algerian Islamism or is simply a public relations move. Algerian authorities consider the shift to be a last-ditch attempt to revitalize a domestic insurgent movement enfeebled by years of combat and internal divisions. The Algerian state, however, has been known to suppress reporting on the real strength of insurgent groups in Algeria, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.

Indeed, there are indications that terrorism in North Africa is on the rise and that the GSPC is alive and well in Algeria. “Despite the official happy talk,” says Olivier Guitta, a Washington-based foreign affairs consultant, “kidnappings by Islamists to raise money for their cause are a routine occurrence in Algeria. And not a day goes by without terrorists' attacking military personnel, government employees, or ordinary civilians, whom they regard as allies of the government.

The group is reported to have cross-border association with separatist groups in Niger, Chad, Mauritania, and Libya, in addition to Islamist organizations in Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco. But the name change doesn’t necessarily indicate a pan-Maghreb al-Qaeda front. “The most we can say is that the GSPC has had contact with these groups,” says Roberts of the International Crisis Group. “But the change of name is not a sign of unification of these groups.”

Why is North Africa susceptible to Islamic terrorism?

North Africa is culturally and geographically distant from more radical strains of Islam in the Middle East. Experts say although the population doesn’t condone al-Qaeda-style terrorism, political Islam has given people a means of social criticism under otherwise repressive regimes. As Ray Takeyh, a senior CFR fellow, points out, “An increasingly disillusioned middle class turned to the Islamists and their devastating critique of the prevailing order.” Unemployment is high in the region, and there are large numbers of young people, two factors that could fuel terrorist activity. Emily Hunt observes that for those who would join terrorist groups, “al-Qaeda’s global ideology intersects with local anger directed at undemocratic regimes that for years allowed mosques to be focal points of popular political activity.”

Does GSPC have a significant presence in Iraq?

Yes. The GSPC has funneled North African insurgents to Iraq to fight as suicide bombers, foot soldiers, and mid-level commanders, says Hunt. Although counting foreign fighters is difficult, Evan F. Kohlmann, a terrorism consultant, estimates that North Africans represent between 9 percent and 25 percent of foreign fighters in Iraq are from North Africa, although the vast majority are still of Saudi and Jordanian origin. “They’re a significant but not dominant presence,” he says. Adil Sakir al-Mukni — a key link between the GSPC and al-Qaeda in Iraq, a group of foreign jihadis founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — was deported by the Syrian government for helping shuttle foreign fighters into Iraq. The GSPC reportedly called on the Zarqawi network to attack French nationals in Iraq and applauded the 2005 killing of two Algerian diplomats there.

Q & A: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (a.k.a. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)

[Al-khiyal]

The decision of the leaders of Algeria's Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) to pledge allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda has been well-covered. The GSPC's proven combat capabilities, willingness to send fighters to Afghanistan, Iraq and other Islamist insurgencies, widespread presence in Western European cities, connections and working relationships to criminal enterprises in Europe and its status as a potential al-Qaeda-related threat to Western oil and natural gas supplies emanating from Algeria are all positive benefits for al-Qaeda [1]. Beyond these tactical and strategic — at least regarding energy supplies — advantages, the GSPC's decision to join al-Qaeda is, from the latter's perspective, part of a bigger, long-labored-for and positive whole.

"The better rule," General Robert E. Lee once said in regard to analyzing enemy intentions, "is to judge our adversaries from their standpoint, not from our own" [2]. With this advice in mind, it becomes clear that the addition of the GSPC to al-Qaeda's ranks fits nicely into the primary mission bin Laden has defined for his organization: instigating and inspiring Muslims to move their focus toward Islam's far enemy, the United States and its allies [3]. This, it should be kept in mind, is much easier said than done. One of the most enduring aspects of 19th century European imperialism and colonialism has been the nationalistic orientation of Islamic resistance groups. Until bin Laden came on the scene, the Islamists were exclusively fighting local tyrannies: the Egyptian Islamists were intent on destroying the Mubarak regime; the Yemenis were bent on overthrowing President Saleh; the Palestinians sought to eliminate Israel; and the Algerians aimed at the military junta in Algiers. This stubbornly nationalistic focus, bin Laden argued, had to be broken and redirected toward the United States, the nation-state that al-Qaeda doctrine holds responsible for keeping Israel's regime and the Muslim tyrannies in power.

Success for bin Laden has been hard to come by. The first break in the nationalist dam came when Ayman al-Zawahiri led the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) into al-Qaeda in early 1998 [4]. Al-Zawahiri had long argued that the road to Jerusalem led through Cairo, but he ditched this deeply held tenet to fight the United States. (NB: Oddly, there are still those who argue that bin Laden is the EIJ chief's mouthpiece, although it is clearly the latter's views, not the former's, that have drastically changed.) The shift of focus of the Egyptian Islamists was augmented in August 2006 when al-Qaeda announced that at least a portion of Egypt's Gama'a al-Islamiyya — under Muhammed al-Hakaima — had joined al-Qaeda [5]. The GSPC pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda, then, is the third major crack in the dam, and with it the two nationalities who historically have been the most near-enemy, nation-centric organizations have sworn loyalty to the concept of destroying the far enemy as the indispensable prelude to eliminating the host of near enemies.

This does not, of course, mean that Algerian and Egyptian Islamists have or will stop attacking targets in their own country. What it does mean, however, and what has begun to occur, is a gradual shift in targeting toward a focus that complements al-Qaeda's war against the United States. In Egypt, the attacks on tourist facilities have hit the country's foreign exchange earner, and Cairo has nowhere else but Washington to turn to make up for any shortfalls. In Algeria, the media has reported increasing GSPC interests in attacking the country's energy infrastructure, security services and expatriate work force.

While these are important achievements for al-Qaeda, it can be argued that success in getting only three major Islamist resistance groups to publicly shift from a near- to far-enemy focus since 1996 means that bin Laden still has a long way to go. Furthermore, while there is an element of truth in that conclusion, the comfort the West can take from it is mitigated by the largely unnoticed success bin Laden has had in refocusing many more Islamists on the far enemy than just those belonging to the EIJ, the Gama'a and the GSPC. Indeed, bin Laden's success can be seen not only in his ability to convince large numbers of individual Islamists, but even more so in the fact that these individuals appear to be forming "al-Qaeda" groups of their own in Europe and across the Arab world.....

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As evidence of bin Laden's success in this regard — and this refers to inspirational and instigating successes that seldom confer command-and-control on al-Qaeda — media reporting since January 2005 shows that nearly 40 organizations have announced their formation and pledged allegiance to bin Laden, al-Qaeda and their strategic objectives. Although not controlled by al-Qaeda, they may have received some logistical, training or financial assistance from al-Qaeda in their formation. A non-scientific and non-exhaustive sampling of the groups reported in the media follows:

- Martyr Marwan Hadid Cell, Al-Qaeda in Syria (Syria)
- The Islamic Revenge Cells (Iraq)
- Brigades of Kurdistan (Iraq)
- Ansar al-Qaeda (Saudi Arabia)
- Al-Qaeda in Bilad al-Sham (Syria)
- Al-Qaeda Organization in the Levant-Umar Brigade-Lebanon Province (Lebanon)
- The Islamic al-Tawhid Group, al-Qaeda Organization (Europe)
- Al-Qaeda Organization in Afghanistan (Afghanistan)
- Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq Brigade, al-Qaeda Organization (Europe)
- Al-Quds Islamic Army (Palestine)
- Al-Qaeda Organization in Lebanon (Lebanon)
- Al-Qaeda in Levant and Egypt-Abdallah Azzam Brigades (Egypt)
- Qaedat-al-Jihad in Yemen, Liwa al-Tawid (Yemen)
- Black Leopards-al-Qaeda Military Faction in Lebanon (Lebanon)
- Brigade of Martyr Nasir Bin-Rashid al-Rashid (Europe)
- Saudi Brigades of Sada Tuwayq in al-Zufi (Saudi Arabia)
- Squadron of the Martyr Abu Annas al-Shami (Saudi Arabia)
- Kata'ib al-Shahid Hammudi al-Masri, al-Qaeda Organization South and East Asia
(Pakistan, Afghanistan, Far East)
- Allah's Brigade (Palestine)
- Secret Organization Group of al-Qaeda of Jihad in Europe (Europe)
- Abu-ali al-Harithi Brigades (Yemen)
- Al-Qaeda Maghreb Commandment (Morocco)
- Al-Qaeda Organization in the Island of the Arabs (Saudi Arabia)

The foregoing list suggests at least three conclusions that should encourage Osama bin Laden and sober Western security services. First, bin Laden's central intention of having his words and al-Qaeda's actions serve not only to harm U.S. interests but also instigate other Muslims to become jihadis seems to have some traction. If the above list could only be built to four or five items, a claim of success for bin Laden could be debated, but the 20-plus groups above and a total inventory now nearing 40 makes those negative arguments moot. The grassroots instigation bin Laden has been conducting is working.

Second, the organizations discussed herein are often referred to as al-Qaeda "franchises" by terrorism experts who also argue that the threat from these groups has replaced the threat from what they refer to as "al-Qaeda Central" — the insurgent apparatus directly commanded and controlled by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. Recent media reports, statements by U.S. officials, and especially by director-general of the British security service MI5 Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller's public description of a working set of al-Qaeda training camps in Pakistan, strongly suggests that al-Qaeda Central is not out of business and that the West now faces two tiers of threat, rather than one from al-Qaeda [6].

Third, the list above appears to reflect bin Laden's success in using Iraq as contiguous territory from which to reach into the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula and even Europe. Historically, al-Qaeda does not expend effort, funds and manpower in regions that do not afford it contiguous safe haven from which to operate; this consideration kept the group from making a major effort in the Balkans, and to date has made it unable to hit the Israelis at home. Yet of the 24 groups listed above, 16 are located in places that al-Qaeda believed new safe havens in Iraq would provide it opportunities for expansion: Egypt (1); Europe (4); Palestine (2); Lebanon (3); Syria (2); and Saudi Arabia (4). Although more research needs to be completed on the idea of Iraq being an al-Qaeda base for projecting itself into adjacent countries, it seems that not all of al-Qaeda's time has been spent fighting U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq [7].

In conclusion, the GSPC's decision to come under al-Qaeda's umbrella is in itself an important story; it is a lethal and talented group that will benefit from its ties to al-Qaeda while extending the capabilities and reach of bin Laden's fighters, especially in Europe and Canada. Yet its accession is clearly part of a bigger story which is seeing al-Qaeda's plans for instigating Muslims to join a jihad aimed at the far enemy beginning to bear fruit, and also how those plans are being furthered by al-Qaeda's ability to operate from bases in Iraq. As the late Sheikh Abdullah Azzam claimed when he and bin Laden worked together in the 1980s, it is the job of Islamist leaders to persuade Muslims to join "the caravan fighting in God's way." Bin Laden is carrying on his mentor's work successfully.

Notes

1. See recent issues of Terrorism Focus and Terrorism Monitor, and the GSPC's declaration of allegiance to al-Qaeda, "The statement and the good news of the joining with and the pledge of allegiance to Sheikh Abu Abdullah Osama bin Laden, may God protect him," Salafist Group for Call and Combat website, September 13, 2006.
2. Peter G. Tsouras, Civil War Quotations: In the Words of the Commanders, New York: Sterling Publishing, Inc., 1998, p. 90.
3. Bin Laden defined this mission in his, "Declaration of Jihad Against the United States," al-Islah, September 2, 1996. He has restated it many times since.
4. "Declaration of the World Islamic Front Against Crusaders and Jews," February 26, 1998.
5. "Al-Zawahiri Announces Egypt's Islamic Group Leaders Joined al-Qaeda," al-Jazeera TV, August 5, 2006. See, also, Terrorism Focus, October 10, 2006.
6. Mark Mazetti, "New Generation of al-Qaeda Chiefs Seen on the Rise," New York Times, April 2, 2007.
7. See, for example, Thair Abbas, "Al-Qaeda Presence Increases in Lebanon," al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 13, 2006; Abd-al-Rahman al-Rashid, "'Al-Qaeda' in Syria," al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 4, 2005; and Annette Young, "Al-Qaeda Gains a Foothold in Palestine," The Scotsman, May 21, 2005.

Al-Qaeda and Algeria's GSPC: Part of a much bigger picture