Attack in Algeria reopens country's war wounds, stirs terror fears

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Attack in Algeria reopens country's war wounds, stirs terror fears

December 12, 2007: Emergency crews spent the night digging through the rubble of the gutted U.N. buildings in Algiers. As rescuers searched for survivors and bodies, family members of the missing waited at the scene for word of their loved ones.

Yesterday's twin car bombings by an al-Qaida-affiliated group hit the Algerian supreme court building and, minutes later, the U.N. buildings in an upscale neighborhood of the Algerian capital.

Today, the unofficial death toll estimates soared well above the Interior Ministry's official tally of 31, with scores - perhaps hundreds - more reported wounded.

One thing remained certain: At least nine of those killed were U.N. staff, making it the worst single attack on a U.N. installation since the 2003 bombing at U.N. headquarters in Baghdad. Twenty-two died in that blast.

Speaking from a climate conference in Bali, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was among the many world leaders condemning the bombing.

BAN KI-MOON, United Nations Secretary-General: I'd like to condemn, in the strongest terms, this is just unacceptable, in whatever the circumstances. It cannot be justified in any circumstances.

MARGARET WARNER: A group called al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb claimed responsibility for the attack in a Web site posting. It described the U.N. offices as "the headquarters of the infidels' den" and declared its aim is to overthrow the Algerian government.

The terrorist group is an offshoot of the Islamic guerrilla movement that waged a bloody, decade-long civil war in the 1990s that left at least 150,000 people dead.

The organization renamed itself al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb last January. Since then, it has claimed responsibility for a number of bombings that have killed more than 80 people.

For more on these attacks and what they may mean for Algeria, North Africa, and the West, we turn to Daniel Byman, director of Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies. His new book is "The Five-Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad."

And Mary-Jane Deeb, who served as a United Nations monitor during the Algerian elections of 1997. She is chief of the African and Middle East Division at the Library of Congress, but the views she expresses here are her own.

And welcome to you both.

Let's start by just talking a little bit more about this group, al-Qaida and the Islamic Maghreb, Professor Byman. Tell us more about this group. And do you have any doubt that they are, in fact, behind this?

DANIEL BYMAN, Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies: This is a group that grew out of the Algerian civil war. That produced a number of very bloody, nasty groups that over time became linked with a more Salafist brand of combatant that, increasingly over time, became linked with bin Laden.

And there's no doubt that this group is behind the attack. They've claimed credit for it. And it's the type of target, the type of method that al-Qaida surrogates tend to favor.

MARGARET WARNER: So what explains the U.N. as a target here?

MARY-JANE DEEB, African and Middle East Division, Library of Congress: The U.N., actually, is symbolic. It means that al-Qaida is joining with the Algerians to fight not an internal war in Algeria, but a much broader war, a war of the Islamic nation, if you want, Islamic war again the West.

And so, by attacking the United Nations, it simply says this is a war against Western presence in the Muslim world. And, Algeria, you are part of this global war that we are fighting in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

MARGARET WARNER: So the fact that this local group, Dan Byman, adopted the al-Qaida name and adopted this affiliation, do you agree that that really has a significance, that it has caused the group to expand its agenda and its aims?

DANIEL BYMAN: Expand and change. The group initially was very focused on Algeria, on overthrowing the Algerian government, and its targets were...

MARGARET WARNER: And installing a theocratic government.

DANIEL BYMAN: Absolutely, a theocratic government that followed a very, very narrow version of jihadist ideology. But this is a much more international agenda. It's much more focus on the world, not only Algeria itself, but well beyond it.

MARGARET WARNER: And what do these links consist of with al-Qaida? I mean, are they operational? Are they logistical? Is it financial?

DANIEL BYMAN: Initially, the links were primarily financial and ideological, al-Qaida ideas that were expanding the horizons of a very local group. Over time, though, we've seen personnel go both ways. In particular, we've seen people go from Algeria to Iraq and learn ideas there, be trained there.

But so far, the operational links are elusive. It doesn't look like bin Laden himself is calling the shots, but there does seem to be some broad strategic agreement on the type of targets.

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MARGARET WARNER: Mary-Jane, fit this into the broader context of North Africa for us, if you could. The director of homeland security, that is the homeland security adviser to the White House, Frances Townsend, went to Algeria, Morocco, and Libya earlier this year to express and talk about U.S. concerns about al-Qaida moving into that region.

And she was quoted as saying that the U.S. was worried that al-Qaida could use this area really as a base, not only to attack Europe, but perhaps to the United States. Is that a valid concern, in your view?

MARY-JANE DEEB: Well, certainly, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are on the front line. They are on the shores of the Mediterranean. It is quite possible for operatives in North Africa to move easily to Europe, and then from Europe to the United States, you know, is another step.

But I would say that definitely those countries are critical, because those have migration to Europe. There's a very great number of people moving, legally and illegally, from North Africa into Europe. And I think that homeland security is very worried about this movement of people.

MARGARET WARNER: And is Algeria particularly vulnerable to either al-Qaida influence or just generally the sort of message and mission of radical groups among these North African countries?

DANIEL BYMAN: Algeria is the country that historically has had the most problems. The civil war in the 1990s killed well over 100,000 people. And although the situation is far more stable than it was 15 years ago, it's still less stable than Algeria's neighbors.

MARGARET WARNER: And why?

DANIEL BYMAN: The government there has less legitimacy in the eyes of many people, doesn't have the kind of traditional authority that Morocco's government has, and simply the history of violence and the incredible brutality on both sides has embittered many Algerians.

MARY-JANE DEEB: And I would concur. And I would add that there are certain factors today that make Algeria even more vulnerable, and that is the election, or the re-election, rather, of the president, Bouteflika. That was really manipulated by the junta in power. And...

MARGARET WARNER: This is a military junta.

MARY-JANE DEEB: It is a military junta. And that left a lot of Algerians very disappointed, dissatisfied with the type of regime that they have in power. On the other hand, they also are faced - that is, the Algerians are also faced with the Islamists.

So they have little choice in terms of who to look up to or to look for help to. Al-Qaida knows that, that Algeria is a very vulnerable country, a country that is searching for leadership, if you want. And, therefore, it is proposing, in a way, an alternative to domestic Islamists and to the government forces there.

MARGARET WARNER: Is there any way of knowing how much support this Islamism as a political movement has within the population as a whole?

MARY-JANE DEEB: You know, it's difficult to say. People have estimated it somewhere between 15 percent and 30 percent, but then exactly what does that mean?

Those who carry out violence or violent acts are usually a very small minority of people. But then there are those who support them, but who would not really kill anyone.

Then there are those who will give money for the broader Islamic cause, but really don't want to know what people are doing. And then there are those who are neutral, and then there are those who are critical.

So there's a vast difference in opinion between people in Algeria. There's a big continuum, and there's also a revulsion with the violence that has taken place.

So, in fact, these actions today may very well boomerang and create a stronger reaction in Algeria against Islamists than al-Qaida anticipates.

MARGARET WARNER: So how well - how is the government there now trying to handle this threat? Because there have been several bombings, including what looked like an assassination attempt on the president earlier this year. And how well equipped are they to fight it?

DANIEL BYMAN: The government is quite well equipped to fight the general threat of terrorism. During the 1990s, it developed an extensive intelligence operation, a very effective security services, although quite brutal, but also did things like an amnesty program and tried to co-opt rival leaders, so it was really effective across the board.

The most recent attacks have not elicited a massive crackdown. And that may be a strategic decision by the government, that they don't want to drive people who are undecided or are not sympathetic to the radicals into their arms.

So, in a way, the government - by its standards, at least - has been showing some degree of restraint. And I think their hope is that, because the targets are U.N. targets, because they feel that the bounce will not elicit sympathy, that simply by going for more low-profile efforts, arrests of radicals and so on, they can cut this off before it starts to snowball.

MARGARET WARNER: Now, Algeria has been enjoying a bit of an economic - I don't know if boom is too strong a word - but because it's a major natural gas exporter, rising energy prices have helped this economy. Do attacks like these undermine that in any way?

MARY-JANE DEEB: Not really. There is so much demand for oil and gas that those attacks will really not affect Algeria in this way. What is important is the increase in the wealth generated by gas and oil is not reflected in developments in the country.

In other words, there is not enough housing. Health care is deplorable. The education system is not keeping up. And, therefore, there is resentment against the government.

MARGARET WARNER: So bottom line here is, Professor Byman, do you expect Algeria to continue to be a sort of al-Qaida target, that is, for al-Qaida to see Algeria as a good potential target for operations?

DANIEL BYMAN: Absolutely. There is a strong sense of ideological sympathy between what the Algerians now believe and what al-Qaida believes. But also there are a lot of personal connections.

And Algeria has a lot to offer al-Qaida. It has a large reservoir of skilled fighters, people trained in violence, and extensive networks in Europe. And these are attractive from an al-Qaida point of view.

MARGARET WARNER: Daniel Byman and Mary-Jane Deeb, thank you both.

DANIEL BYMAN: Thank you.

Interviews available in podcast (RealAudio and mp3) format via link to article

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December 14, 2007 -- Few countries in the world are as haunted by the horrors of their own past as Algeria. Colonised in 1830, Algeria was the jewel in France's colonial empire, a land transformed from a vassal Ottoman province ruled by Barbary pirates and Sufi brotherhoods into a full department of France, populated by more than a million white settlers, the fabled pied-noirs.

The Algerian revolt against France mesmerised the newly independent colonies of the Third World in the 1950s. Even though the French state was decimated by the Nazis in 1940, evicted from Vietnam at the epic battle of Diem Bien Phu in 1954, checkmated by Nasser and Eisenhower in its ill fated invasion of the Suez Canal Zone, forced to grant independence to Morocco and Tunisia (albeit as political vassals of the Quai d'Orsay), France decided to surpress the Algerian nationalist revolt in a ghastly choreography of horror that cost the lives of millions of Arabs and 30,000 French. The English historian Alistair Horne's book on the Algerian war of independence, "A Savage War of Peace", which mesmerised me in my college dorm two decades ago, was cited by President Bush on CNN as his guide to understanding the pathology of guerilla warfare and counter terrorism in Iraq.

Wrong analogy, Mr Bush. The US is not fighting insurgents in Diyala and Anbar province to annex the Iraqi state or impose its "mission civilisatrice" (civilising mission) on the Arabs, as the French sought. Nor was access to oil reserves a factor in France's obsession to control Algeria. Above all, Bush does not have to worry about a million American settlers determined to resist any political rapprochement or troop withdrawals with a wave of bombings, assassinations, coup attempts and mass murder, the modus operandi of the French settlers. In fact, the movie, 'Day of the Jackal' depicts the hiring of a professional assassin by the renegade Organisation Army Secrete (OAS) to murder President Charles De Gaulle as his motorcade left the Elysee Palace.

Yet in a deeper sense, the Algerian past has an eerie resonance in contemporary Iraq with its lethal cocktail of revolutionary terror, counterinsurgency, Islamist militancy, the economics of oppression and state sanctioned violence, including torture. President Bush would do well to watch the movie "Battle of Algiers", banned in France for decades, that depicted how terror becomes a coldly rational instrument of war for human beings Frantz Fanon called "the wretched of earth". The French conscience is still haunted by the odious atrocities committed by its troops in Algerie Francaise. On a recent visit to Algeria, President Sarkozy did not apologise but suggested it was the time to "come to terms with history, with its light side and dark side".

The Algerian war of independence demonstrated the revival of political Islam as a potent ideology of revolt, tested the relevance of the UN as a midwife of the embryonic past- colonial order, enabled Nasser and the FLN rebel leadership to refine the ideology of militant pan- Arab nationalism and was an early proxy Cold War battlefield, as the Kremlin embraced the rebel cause to advance Soviet interests in the Arab world. Algeria literally earned its independence from France in a maelstrom of blood and slaughter in 1962.

Yet fate held no fairy tale ending for independent Algeria. The FLN created a totalitarian, Leninist one party state with a Politburo, a Central Committee, vicious factions and a fatal dependence on the regime's military and secret police. President Ahmed Ben Bella was overthrown in a military coup by army commander Houari Boumédiène. The FLN's Algeria became a virtual vassal of the Soviet Union, its revolutionary passions engaged in issues like North Vietnam, Palestine and apartheid South Africa rather than addressing its own colossal economic failure, human rights abuses and governance deficit. Boumedienne was succeeded as President by Chadli Benjadid, whose tepid political reforms were undermined by a collapse in crude oil prices in the mid- 1980's.

The violence and brutality of the Algerian civil war exceeded even the nightmare in Iraq. The Pouvoir, the shadowy cabal of ruthless generals and Securite Militaire spy chiefs who dominated the regime, engineered the most successful counter- terrorism campaign against jihadist violence in the Middle East. The GIS rebels shot foreign journalists and Trappist monks, beheaded unveiled school teachers in front of their child pupils, slit the throats (engorgement) of government conscripts captured in ambushes, random bombings of coffee houses and schools in the Casbahs of Algiers and Oran. But the regime infiltrated the GIA, as the memoirs of a former military intelligence colonel asserts, instigated some of the massacres of civilians that so revolted the West. Yet the Algerian civil war was fought and won by the regime without the full glare of the international media. Algeria's tortured past holds existential lessons for the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Joseph Stiglitz's "oil curse" leads to a fatal concentration of power. State capitalism does not work. Islamist rhetoric is used to dignify violence by power crazed rebels and incumbent regimes. Slitting the throats of teachers and government troops only creates revulsion among the local populace and foreign media. Sadly, counter-terror alone can vanquish terror, a lesson proved in both the Algerian scrubland and the slums of Asyut, Upper Egypt.

The Algerian military high command and FLN nomenklatura won the civil war but at a terrible cost. More than 200,000 lives were lost, Algeria became an international economic pariah and GIA terrorists even hijacked an Air France plane and planned to crash it into the Eiffel Tower, an eerie premonition of 9/11. Algeria remains haunted by its own past.

Algeria: War, terror and a haunted past